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Abstract
We introduce elements of state-dependent pricing and strategic comple-
mentarity into an otherwise standard New Open Economy Macroeconomics
(NOEM) model. Relative to previous NOEM works, there are new implica-
tions for the dynamics of real and nominal economic activity: complementarity
in the timing of price adjustment alters an open economy￿ s response to mon-
etary disturbances. Using a two-country Producer-Currency-Pricing environ-
ment, our framework replicates key international features following a domestic
monetary expansion: (i) a delayed surge in in￿ ation across countries, (ii) a
delayed overshooting of exchange rates, (iii) a J-curve dynamic in the domes-
tic trade balance, and (iv) a high international output correlation relative to
consumption correlation. Overall, the model is consistent with many empirical
aspects of international economic ￿ uctuations, while stressing pricing behavior
and exchange rate e⁄ects highlighted in traditional Keynesian works.
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11 Introduction
The international economic literature has long believed that exchange rate changes
redirect global expenditure in the presence of price rigidity. Dornbusch (1987), Krug-
man (1991), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000), and Obstfeld (2002) provide empirical evi-
dence that the expenditure-switching e⁄ect of exchange rate changes is alive and well
among industrial countries. To represent this relationship, Figure 1.1 displays annual
changes in US nominal exchange rates versus annual changes in US bilateral real
exports to Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom over the past 30 years.
The positive correlations between changes in currency values and changes in export
demand suggest that exchange rate movements remains an important determinant of
trade ￿ ows.
Like the traditional international economic approach, recent work on the New
Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) builds in pricing frictions and studies their
implications for the dynamics of exchange rates, trade balances, and other macroeco-
nomic variables. However, while introducing better microeconomic foundations, the
NOEM literature has not successfully incorporated the basic intuition, features, and
predictions found in the traditional Keynesian approach: the canonical NOEM model
has at best a small expenditure-switching e⁄ect and has many other predictions that
di⁄er sharply from the observed empirical evidence. Furthermore, both the tradi-
tional Keynesian approach and the NOEM literature have been criticized because of
ad hoc pricing elements. The traditional Keynesian approach keeps prices ￿xed for
the duration of the analysis or adopts mechanical price adjustment rules while in the
NOEM literature, optimizing price-setters can only change the magnitude but not
the timing of adjustments.
This paper introduces elements of state-dependent pricing and strategic comple-
mentarity into an otherwise standard NOEM model. Relative to previous NOEM
works, there are new implications for the dynamics of real and nominal economic
activity: complementarity in the timing of price adjustment alters an open econ-
omy￿ s response to monetary disturbances. Under a Producer-Currency-Pricing en-
vironment, our framework replicates key international features following a domestic
monetary expansion: (i) a delayed surge in in￿ ation across countries, (ii) a delayed
overshooting of exchange rates, (iii) a J-curve dynamic in the domestic trade balance,
and (iv) a high international output correlation relative to consumption correlation.
Overall, our open economy macroeconomic model is consistent with many empirical
aspects of international economic ￿ uctuations, while stressing pricing behavior and
exchange rate e⁄ects highlighted in the traditional Keynesian approach. In addi-
tion, our model emphasizes the expenditure-switching e⁄ect as an important channel
of international monetary policy transmission and consequently keeps the spirit of
Mundell (1963), Fleming (1962), and Dornbusch (1976) within the con￿nes of the
microfounded dynamic general equilibrium framework.
2The key to the model￿ s results is the combination of state-dependent pricing and
strategic complementarity. As opposed to the NOEM literature where the timing
of price adjustment is ￿xed, the interaction of state-dependent pricing and strategic
complementarity o⁄ers an environment in which ￿rms can choose the timing of price
adjustment and consequently coordinate their actions. On the one hand, forward
looking price-setting ￿rms would prefer to raise their prices in light of a monetary
expansion. On the other hand, ￿rms know that they have the possibility to reset
their prices at any time in the future, and would rather do so than lose market share
by pricing high relative to the aggregate price level. This behavior leads to price
responses that are extremely slow and therefore closed to those engineered in the
traditional Keynesian approach. On aggregate, this implies a gradual transmission
of monetary policy shocks to prices, in￿ ation, and the nominal exchange rate, and
ultimately to aggregate economic activities: relative price movements lead to ￿ uctu-
ations in output, consumption, and trade balances that are similar to those observed
in the data, and which were the focus of standard Keynesian models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o⁄ers a background
on the international transmission of monetary policy. Section 3 describes our open
economy macroeconomic model. Section 4 discusses the model￿ s implications using
a hypothetical two-country framework. In this section, we analyze the endogenous
evolution of price distributions in response to a expansionary monetary policy shock,
describe the way these distributions in￿ uence international economic activity, and
contrast the implications of our model with a corresponding time-dependent variant
which is used as a reference case because of its popularity in the current literature. To
clear ideas, Section 5 provides an agnostic empirical exercise aimed at understanding
the model￿ s hits and misses. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Background: The Received Wisdom
The following standard views form our background on the international transmission
of monetary policy shocks and guide us in building our open economy macroeconomic
model.
1. Exchange rate changes redirect global expenditure. Dornbusch (1987),
Krugman (1991), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000), and Obstfeld (2002) document
the expenditure-switching role of nominal exchange rate: a country with a
depreciating currency experiences a fall in the relative price of its exports redi-
recting world expenditure in favor of its product.
2. Monetary policy expansions stimulate world aggregate demand. Em-
pirical studies concerning the transmission of monetary policy shocks in open
3economies generally reinforce the view that US monetary expansions have a
positive spillover e⁄ect on other developed economies by stimulating world ag-
gregate demand (Sims (1992), Kim (2001), and Faust and Rogers (2003) among
others).
3. The trade balance displays a J-curve dynamic following a domestic
monetary expansion. Kim (2001) ￿nds that US monetary policy expansions
generate a dynamic pattern in the domestic trade balance similar to the famous
J-curve e⁄ect: domestic monetary expansions lead to a short-term worsening
followed by a long-run improvement of the trade balance similar to the notion
of income-absorption and expenditure-switching e⁄ects of Keynesian models.
4. The exchange rate overshoots its long-run value following a mone-
tary policy shock. Empirical research has struggled to support the impact
change of nominal exchange rate following monetary disturbances predicted by
Dornbusch￿ s (1976) famous exchange rate overshooting hypothesis. For exam-
ple, Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) ￿nd delayed overshooting in exchange rates
up to three years. Although reaching the same qualitative conclusion about
delayed overshooting of exchange rates, Kim and Roubini (2000), Faust and
Rogers (2003), and Scholl and Uhlig (2005) note quicker responses.
5. International output correlations are higher than international con-
sumption correlations. A well documented characteristic of international
business cycles is the high cross-country output correlation relative to con-
sumption correlation. This feature of the data has been documented by Backus
et al. (1995) and Baxter (1995) as stylized facts that the international business
cycle program should aim to capture. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000) revisit the
issue and conclude that the relation between cross-country correlation of output
and consumption remains a puzzle to existing open economy macroeconomics
models. Ambler et al. (2004) note that replicating the cross-country corre-
lations of consumption remains a signi￿cant challenge for dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models, especially when those models assume a high degree
of international risk sharing.
3 Structure of the Model
The NOEM builds small scale dynamic general equilibrium models for open economy
macroeconomics and is the departure point for our work.1 The world economy consists
of two countries each having (i) a representative in￿nitely lived household, (ii) a
1Examples include Betts and Devereux (2000), Chari et al. (2002), Kollmann (2001), Bergin and
Feenstra (2001), and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995, 2000).
4continuum of ￿rms indexed on the unit interval, and (iii) a monetary authority. In
what follows, each variable is represented by a country-speci￿c subscript (i.e.: 1 and
2 for Country 1 and Country 2 respectively). When three subscripts are attached
to a single variable, the ￿rst and second denote the country of production and the
country of consumption respectively, and the third subscript denotes time.
3.1 The Households
Households are identical across countries except for the local bias introduced in con-
sumption. They demand consumption goods produced in both countries and supply
factors of production on a competitive basis. Households in both countries maximize
the following time separable objective function de￿ned over consumption goods (c)





t (u(ct) ￿ v (nt)) (1)
where ￿ is the subjective discount factor and u(ct;nt) is the momentary utility func-
tion with characteristics uc > 0, ucc < 0, vn > 0, and vnn > 0. These characteristics
imply that u(c) is increasing and concave, and that v(n) is increasing and convex.
Concavity of u(c) indicates diminishing marginal utility of consumption, while con-
vexity of v(n) suggests increasing marginal disutility from labor supply. More specif-
ically, our momentary utility function has the following form, where ￿ governs the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ￿ governs the elasticity of labor supply











We assume that households prefer to consume locally produced goods. This fea-
ture generates movements in relative prices and reinforces the terms of trade as an
important channel through which country-speci￿c output movements a⁄ect welfare:
following a decline in imported good prices, households do not fully substitute do-
mestic for imported goods in their consumption basket. Instead, households consume
a relatively ￿xed basket with a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of domestic goods, and the remaining
￿ of foreign goods. This speci￿cation is consistent with the data since the ratios of
imports to GDP are relatively stable in the long-run. We let (1 ￿ ￿) determines the
degree of home bias in the steady-state, and ￿ the elasticity of substitution between




































5In this context, the following equations de￿ne the optimal allocations between do-
mestic and imported consumption






























which depend on overall consumption, domestic and imported producer price indices
(hereafter PPIs) denoted by P P, overall consumer price indices (hereafter CPIs) de-
noted by P C, and on the nominal exchange rate S de￿ned as the price of one unit of
foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency.
Our benchmark economy evolves under complete domestic and international ￿-
nancial markets. This implies that households can freely reallocate risk through
a complete set of state-contingent nominal bonds b and corresponding stochastic
discount factor D, such that Et[Dt+1bt+1] =
P
st+1 ￿(st+1jst)D(st+1jst)b(st+1) where
￿(st+1jst) denotes the probability of the state of nature st+1 given st. The households
also receive nominal wages W from labor services, and a series of dividend payments
Z from ￿rms. The sequence of intertemporal budget constraints can be represented
in terms of aggregates as
P
C
1;tc1;t + Et[Dt+1b1;t+1] ￿ b1;t + W1;tn1;t + Z1;t (5)
P
C
2;tc2;t + Et[Dt+1b2;t+1] ￿ b2;t + W2;tn2;t + Z2;t.
We assume that prices are set in the currency of the producer and that there is no
impediment to trade so that the law of one price holds. In this environment, house-
holds choose an amounts consumption, labor, and portfolio holdings to maximize
their lifetime utility (1) subject to a sequence of intertemporal budget constraints (5)
and allocation of time. The maximization problem implies the following risk sharing







re￿ ecting initial wealth di⁄erences ￿




That is, the existence of complete ￿nancial markets implies that the ratios of mar-
ginal utilities of consumption ￿ are equalized across countries such that the levels
of consumption de￿ned in (3) di⁄er only to the extent that the real exchange rate
deviates from its steady-state value.2 Finally, the level of nominal aggregate demand
is governed by a money demand relationship of the form Mt=P C
t = ct along with
country-speci￿c monetary policies.
2Deviations in the real exchange rate are allowed by the local consumption bias introduced in
preferences.
63.2 Strategic Complementarity and Demand Functions
Strategic complementarity among individual ￿rms is introduced by allowing for vari-
able demand elasticity as suggested by Kimball (1995). This approach is consistent
with microeconomic evidence suggesting that competitors￿actions play a central role
in the behavior of price adjustments.3 The Kimball demand function makes it more
costly for ￿rms to get their prices out of line with the average price set by other ￿rms
than the standard Dixit-Stiglitz demand as illustrated by the relative demand and
corresponding pro￿t functions plotted in Figure 1.2.4 This concept has been intro-
duced by Stiglitz (1979) and Ball and Romer (1990), and more recently within the
NOEM literature by Bergin and Feenstra (2001) and Bouakez (2005). However, as
opposed to the NOEM literature where the timing of price adjustment is ￿xed, strate-
gic complementarity and state-dependent pricing increases the interaction between
￿rms as they opt to keep their price in line with the general level of product prices:
strategic complementarity makes it desirable for ￿rms to keep their prices similar to
those of others while state-dependent pricing makes it feasible for them to do so.
3.2.1 Firm￿ s Relative Demand
We follow the approach outlined by Kimball (1995) and consider the following general








￿(d(z)=d)dz = 1 (7)
where d represents a country-speci￿c aggregate demand for goods which is implicitly
de￿ned by a demand aggregator ￿ such that an aggregate producer price index P P
holds for each country. In this environment, each ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated
product such that P (z) identi￿es the price of the good charged by an individual ￿rm
z with corresponding relative demand d(z)=d. Moreover, our speci￿c aggregator ￿
is an increasing and concave function re￿ ecting diminishing demand elasticity, and













3Examples include Bills and Klenow (2004), and Blinder (1991, 1994) for the United States.
4The NOEM literature typically assume that ￿rms face a constant elasticity of demand. This
assumption implies that the optimal price-setting rule is a constant markup over marginal cost.
Therefore, cost considerations become central to a ￿rm￿ s price setting decision leaving little room
for interactions between competitors. The constant elasticity counterpart is exploited in Landry
(2004).
5The parameter % determines the elasticity of demand at the average level of product prices while
’ determines the curvature of the demand function. A nice property of this speci￿cation is that
the Dixit and Stiglitz aggregator is a special case represented by ’ = 0. Derivation of the above
equations are provided in Appendix B.
7This demand aggregator implicitly de￿nes ￿rm￿ s relative demand as a function of






















































As in standard Keynesian models, the expenditure-switching e⁄ect arises as move-
ments in the nominal exchange rate alter the price of imports faced by consumers
and in turn the composition of CPIs.
3.3 The Firms
There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms located on the unit
interval and indexed by z in each country. At any date t, a ￿rm is identi￿ed by its





menu cost is denominated in labor hours and drawn from a time-invariant distribu-
tion G(￿) that is common across all country-speci￿c ￿rms. Since the indices z are
uncorrelated over time, and there are no other state variables attached to individual
￿rms, all country-speci￿c price-adjusting ￿rms choose the same optimal price b P. We
restrict ourselves to environments with positive steady-state in￿ ation rates so that
the bene￿t of price adjustment becomes in￿nitely large as the number of periods for
which the price has been ￿xed grows. Given that the support of the distribution G(￿)
is ￿nite, there exist ￿nite fractions of ￿rms sharing a common price in each country
denoted by J1 and J2 and de￿ned as vintages.
83.3.1 Production and Demand
Labor used for price adjustment is denoted na(z) and labor used for production is
denoted ny(z). The total amount of labor is thus na(z) + ny(z) = n(z). Technology
is linear in labor, and ￿rms are subject to a common country-speci￿c stochastic total




Using (4), aggregate demand d is determined by domestic and exported consump-
tion
















































Equation (12) illustrates that production by an individual ￿rm depends on its price
relative to other domestic ￿rms (PPI), and on its country-speci￿c aggregate demand
(11) which is determined by the degree of home bias, the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and imported goods, the currency adjusted PPI to CPI ratios, and
aggregate domestic and foreign consumption.
3.3.2 Pricing Policy
In both state- and time-dependent pricing frameworks, the ￿rm￿ s optimal decision can
be represented using a dynamic programming approach: given the level of technology,
demand (12), the current menu cost of price adjustment ￿(z), the current real price
pC(z), and the prevailing real wage rate w, individual ￿rms decide whether or not to
adjust their prices with respect to a state vector s. Accordingly, each individual ￿rm


































9with the value if the individual ￿rm does (v0t) or does not (vjt) adjust, and real











jt ￿  t
￿
￿ yjt (14)
where b pC is the optimal price chosen by the country-speci￿c adjusting ￿rms. Both,
the optimal b pC and current real price pC(z), are relative to domestic CPI such that
b pC = b P(z)=P C and pC(z) = P(z)=P C which are the appropriate prices in the ￿rm￿ s
decision making, ￿t;t+1 = ￿t+1=￿t denotes the ratio of future to current marginal
utility and is the appropriate discount factor for future real pro￿ts, and  t represents
real marginal cost which is equal to  t = wt=at. Equation (13) shows that the ￿rm
must weight the current and future bene￿ts of adjusting its price versus the status-
quo. Firms that decide to adjust set prices optimally and choose cost-minimizing
levels of input. Firms that decide not to adjust prices take their output as given
and simply choose input to minimize cost. In this environment, the country-speci￿c
endogenous adjustment fractions ￿j;t are determined by the menu cost of the marginal
￿rms being just equal to the value gained such that
￿ (￿j;t) ￿ w(st) = v0;t(st) ￿ vj;t(st): (15)
Finally, the dynamic program (13) implies that the optimal price satis￿es an Euler
equation that involves balancing pricing e⁄ects on current and expected future pro￿ts.





















Iterating the Euler equation (16) forward, the country-speci￿c ￿rm nominal optimal











































where ￿j;t;t+j represents the probability of non-adjustment from t to t + j and ￿j;t+j
denotes the elasticity of demand facing the individual ￿rm. Accordingly, the optimal
price is a ￿xed markup over real marginal cost if the demand elasticities, the price
levels, and real marginal cost are expected to be constant over time.
10The optimal pricing rules (17) are generalizations of the types derived in NOEM
models with exogenous probabilities (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995)). They also repre-
sent an open economy version of the closed economy state-dependent pricing rules of
Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999), and Dotsey and King (2005). However, in contrast
to their closed economy counterparts, foreign economic conditions and the nominal
exchange rate enter the decision of the value maximizing ￿rms and henceforth in-
￿ uence the endogenous adjustment probabilities. The pricing rules illustrate that
optimal prices vary with adjustment probabilities, discount factors, demand elastic-
ities, real marginal costs, domestic PPIs and CPIs, and current and expected future
demand (which includes global consumption, domestic and foreign CPIs, domestic
PPIs, and the nominal exchange rate).
3.4 Monetary Policies
The monetary policy rules are speci￿ed as exogenous money supply rules. More
speci￿cally, the nominal money supply growth follows an autoregressive process in
both countries
￿M1;t = ￿1￿M1;t￿1 + #1￿M2;t + ￿1;t (18)
￿M2;t = ￿2￿M2;t￿1 + #2￿M1;t + ￿2;t
where ￿ describes the coe¢ cients of autocorrelation, # admits for the possibility of
monetary policy comovements, and ￿t are independently and identically distributed
zero-mean disturbances.
3.5 General Equilibrium
In this environment, the aggregate state of the economy at time t is a vector st =
(M1;t;M2;t; ￿1;t;￿2;t) where M represents the exogenous state variables, and ￿ rep-
resents the evolution of producer prices within each country (country￿ s speci￿c vec-
tor of prices and corresponding density distribution of ￿rms across prices). Given
the aggregate state, a general equilibrium for the economy is a collection of se-
quences satisfying a set of equilibrium conditions: a collection of allocations for con-
sumers c1;t;n1;t;b1;t+1 and c2;t;n2;t;b2;t+1, a collection of allocations and price for ￿rms
y1;t(z);n1;t(z);P(z) and y2;t(z);n2;t(z);P(z), and a collection of prices P P
1;t;P C
1;t;W1;t;
D1;t+1 and P P
2;t;P C
2;t;W2;t;D2;t+1 such that (i) consumers maximize their utilities, (ii)
￿rms maximize their values, and (iii) aggregate consistency conditions hold. These
aggregate consistency conditions include market clearing conditions in the goods and
labor markets, and consistency for the time-varying distributions of ￿rms in each
country.
114 Hypothetical Economy
4.1 Solution and Benchmark Parameterization
4.1.1 Solution
We use numerical methods to solve the model and study its behavior. First, we
compute the steady state equilibrium by imposing trade account balance to the long-
run behavior of the model. The steady-state equilibrium for this economy involves the
lowest value of vintages that generates unconditional adjustment by all ￿rms in each
country. Second, we take a linear approximation of the behavioral equations around
the steady state equilibrium and compute the resulting linear rational expectations
equilibrium using an algorithm developed by King and Watson (1998).
4.1.2 Benchmark Parameterization
To better understand the model and its implications, we ￿rst build our intuition using
a hypothetical symmetric two-country economy. The hypothetical parametrization of
our two-country system is presented in Table 1.1. We use parameter values generally
accepted in the macroeconomic and open economy literatures. A time period of
the model corresponds to a quarter of a year. The subjective discount factors ￿
imply annual real rate of returns of 4.1 percent. We choose preference parameter
values that produce a low elasticity of marginal cost with respect to real output
by setting the parameters governing the degrees of risk aversion ￿ to 0.25 and the
parameters governing the elasticities of labor supply ￿ to 0.05. Those parameters
generate elasticities of marginal cost of approximately 0.3.6 Agents work 20 percent
of their time endowment. Country 1 and 2 are of equal sizes and have degrees of
home bias of 20 percent. We set the elasticities of substitution between domestic
and imported consumption goods ￿ to unity. Bergin (2004) o⁄ers empirical evidence
from macro-level data which supports this common practice in the literature. The
two countries share similar levels of productivity a equal to 1. Finally, we set steady-
state money growth rates ￿ to 0.01 which correspond to growth rates of 4 percent on
an annual basis, and the autocorrelations of the money growth processes ￿ to 0.5.
4.1.3 Demand Structure and Price Distributions
The variable elasticity demand curves are parametrized by choosing values of % so
that demand curves have elasticities of 10 at d(z)=d = 1. Restricting ’ to take values
of 1.02 implies that a 1 percent increase in price decreases demand by 13 percent,
6Given that the households e¢ ciency condition is wt = c￿
t n￿, and that consumption and labor
are approximately equal to output, the elasticities of marginal cost are approximately equal to ￿+￿.
12which is somewhere between the response assumed Kimball (1995), and Bergin and
Feenstra (2001).
The remaining parameters involve the distributions of adjustment costs which,
alongside the demand functions, determine the timing and distributions of prices.
Table 1.2 displays the steady-state fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms as well as the
population densities associated with the parametrized model for both countries.7
The chosen adjustment costs structure leads to a steady-state hazard function that
is roughly quadratic in the log relative price deviation as suggested by Caballero
and Engle (1993). It implies an average age of prices of less then 2.72 quarters, and
an expected price duration of 4 quarters under the steady-state in￿ ation rate of 4
percent. Together, the demand and adjustment costs speci￿cations provide a reason-
able approximation of the main features governing the pattern of price adjustments
and pricing policies observed in empirical studies on pricing behavior in developed
economies.
4.2 Understanding the Model and its Implications
In this subsection, we analyze the model￿ s responses to a monetary policy shock and
contrast these responses with those from a time-dependent variant more closely re-
lated to standard NOEM work. We subject Country 1 to a monetary policy shock
in which the money stock increases 1 percent on impact with a long-run response
approaching 2 percent above its initial level. Figures 1.3-1.6 display the impulse re-
sponse of microeconomic and macroeconomic aggregates over horizons of 16 quarters.
The solid lines represent our state-dependent version of the model, while the dashed
lines represent its time-dependent counterpart. The time-dependent counterpart is
calibrated so that the fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms are held ￿xed at steady-state
values. To get a better understanding of the mechanism through which money a⁄ects
international economic activity, we start by exploring the reaction of individual ￿rms
to the monetary policy shock and then turn to the aggregate implications.
4.2.1 Firms￿Reactions to a Monetary Shock
Figure 1.3 displays the ￿rms￿reactions to Country 1￿ s monetary expansion. The top
row displays the fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms while the bottom row displays the
associated optimal prices chosen by the price-adjusting ￿rms. Relative to similar
experiments in the NOEM literature, a novel feature of the state-dependent pric-
ing open economy model is the evolving distributions of price-adjusting ￿rms across
countries and their corresponding in￿ uences on ￿rm￿ s optimal prices.
7Choice of the adjustment costs parameters are detailed in Appendix C.
13In Country 1, raising product demand generated by the monetary expansion in-
creases the value of price-adjusting ￿rms and consequently induces a larger fraction
of ￿rms to reset their prices. The introduction of variable elasticity demand curves
generates smooth movements in adjusting fractions as ￿rms bunch their actions.8 Ini-
tially, the monetary expansion translates very little to ￿rm￿ s adjusting fraction and
corresponding optimal price as ￿rms are not willing to act di⁄erently from one an-
other. On the one hand, the forward looking price-setting ￿rm would prefer to raise
its price in light of the monetary policy shock. On the other hand, the ￿rm knows
that it has the possibility to reset its prices at any time in the future, and would
rather do so than lose market share by pricing high relative to its competitors. After
a few quarters, the monetary expansion snowballs into the adjusting fraction and
corresponding optimal price as changes in individual prices feed into the aggregate
price level and increase the bene￿t of price adjustments. Finally, the optimal price
overshoots its long-run value as ￿rms try to keep up with the in￿ ation dynamics:
the larger fraction of price-adjusting ￿rms has increased the level of aggregate prices
above their long-run values and consequently induces price-adjusting ￿rms to price
high. This overshooting dynamics is absent in the time-dependent counterpart but
will revealed to be important in explaining international economic ￿ uctuations. Al-
together, the smooth movements in the distributions of price-adjusting ￿rms heavily
in￿ uence the dynamics of aggregate prices and are responsible for the novel responses
of aggregate economic activity.
In Country 2, the fraction of price-adjusting ￿rms and corresponding optimal
prices initially decreases. Country 1￿ s monetary expansion generates an appreciation
of the foreign currency and consequently decreases domestic and export demands for
Country￿ s 2 products. Domestic demand decreases because of the in￿ ow of cheaper
goods coming from Country 1 while higher export prices decreases export demand.
In turn, lower product demand decrease the value of price-adjusting ￿rms and con-
sequently induces a smaller fraction of ￿rms to adjust prices: to compete against
foreign goods, some ￿rms delay their price adjustment while others decrease their
prices. A few quarters later, adjusting fraction and corresponding optimal prices
surge in positive territories as demand increases.
The ￿rms￿reactions under the state-dependent model is in sharp contrast with
its time-dependent counterpart. In time-dependent models, individual ￿rms do not
have any control over the timing of price adjustments and must therefore incorporate
their inability to reset prices in their pricing policy. This results into a jump in
optimal prices followed by a monotonic adjustment to long-run values. This pricing
behavior is responsible for the front-loading aspect of aggregate prices common to
time-dependent pricing models.
8This is in contrast with a Dixit and Stiglitz demand speci￿cation exploited in Landry (2004).
144.2.2 Aggregate Implications of a Monetary Shock
Domestic Aggregates
Output, Consumption, and In￿ ation Dynamics We now turn to the ag-
gregate implications of our model. Figure 1.4 displays the responses of output, con-
sumption, and CPI in￿ ation rates. First, the domestic monetary shock generates a
hump-shaped response in output and consumption across countries. In Country 1,
peak responses of output and consumption arise contemporaneously 2 quarters after
the monetary policy shock. In Country 2, output responds ￿rst, peaking 3 quarters
after the monetary policy shock, while the peak response of consumption is delayed
to the 5th quarter. The dynamics of output and consumption in Country 2 arise as
follows: output responds to an increase in export demand followed by an increase in
domestic demand, while consumption rises driven by price movements in the CPI.
The timing of output and consumption movements generates a high cross-country
output correlation relative to consumption correlation: the cross-correlation of output
is 0.55 and the cross-correlation of consumption is 0.32. This is in sharp contrast with
correlation numbers obtained in the time-dependent counterpart where the cross-
correlation of output is 0.96 and the cross-correlation of consumption is 0.92. This
result arises even if (i) the model embodies international risk-sharing, and (ii) the
model does not rely on international market segmentation to induce discrepancies
in consumption aggregates.9 We explore in further detail the components of foreign
output and consumption below.
Output and consumption aggregates in both economies also display oscillating
cycles associated with movements in aggregate prices. The stimulation of economic
activity lasts roughly 7 and 12 quarters for the domestic and foreign economies re-
spectively, followed by a period of real contractions. Although real contractions in
economic activity last for a substantial amount of time, they do not undo the initial
stimulations generated by the monetary expansion in either countries. Altogether, the
output and consumption aggregates return to their pre-shock level in both countries
after roughly 16 quarters.
Those ￿ uctuations in output and consumption are induced by corresponding move-
ments in price indices. An important strength of the model is its ability to generate
9An increasing amount of research have relied on international market segmentation, or so-
called Pricing-to-Market models, to generate consistent international movements in output and
consumption. Among others, Betts and Devereux (2000) assume market segmentation for a fraction
of ￿rms and show how this speci￿cation can be used to attain the observed consumption correlation
moments. Instead, Chari et al. (2002) impose market segmentation for all ￿rms and rely on
monetary policy endogeneity to obtain the desired correlation. In their model, international market
segmentation is necessary to cleave the relation between output and consumption, while cross-
correlated monetary shocks are needed to provide a consumption expansion abroad.
15initial price inertia and consequently delayed responses in CPI in￿ ations. The bottom
row of Figure 1.4 displays the CPI in￿ ation dynamics. In Country 1, CPI in￿ ation
peaks 5 quarters after the monetary shock. In Country 2, CPI in￿ ation responds
negatively on impact as the domestic exchange rate depreciation alters the CPI.
However, as Country 2￿ s demand increases, CPI in￿ ation surges into positive terri-
tory and peaks 12 quarters after the monetary policy shock. These delayed responses
of CPI in￿ ation rates observed in our model are generated by corresponding move-
ments in CPIs, and consequently can mostly be understood alongside movements in
country-speci￿c ￿rm￿ s adjustment fractions and optimal prices during high in￿ ation
periods.
International Aggregates
In our model, movements in relative prices dictate the behavior of real aggregates,
both within and across countries. Therefore, before turning to the real side of trade,
we study the model￿ s implications for the nominal exchange rate and the terms of
trade. Then, we turn to the model￿ s implications for trade ￿ ows and other real
macroeconomic aggregates.
Nominal Side of Trade Movements in the nominal exchange rate can be un-
derstood by looking at the dynamic behavior of its components which are displayed
in the top row of Figure 1.5. The monetary shock induces a signi￿cant and persistent
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate, and displays the delayed overshooting ef-
fect stressed by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) empirical study on the e⁄ects of US
monetary policy shocks on exchange rates. The bottom row of Figure 1.5 displays the
relative contribution of nominal exchange components. Short-term responses of the
nominal exchange rate are mostly in the real exchange rate: these are relative price
changes that a⁄ect demand composition. At longer horizons, the nominal exchange
rate is mainly a⁄ected by the domestic price level in a close to neutral manner.10
The left column of Figure 1.6 displays the nominal exchange rate, the price of
exports and imports, and the terms of trade described as the ratio of imports to
exports prices. The terms of trade turns positive following the domestic monetary
expansion: while domestic prices remain relatively stable, nominal exchange rate
movements feeds into import prices. However, after a few quarters, the terms of
10Figure 1.5 aknowledges the model￿ s failure to generate real and nominal exchange rate move-
ments that are highly correlated as in the data. However, most of the correlation between real and
nominal exchange rates often found in the NOEM literature results from simultaneous front-loading
aspects of prices and consumption common to time-dependent models.
16trade becomes negative as the domestic monetary expansion snowballs into domestic
prices and neutralizes movements in nominal exchange rate.
Real Side of Trade The right column of Figure 1.6 displays the trade balance
for Country 1, and decomposes Country 2￿ s output and consumption aggregates into
their domestic and foreign components. From the perspective of Country 1, move-
ments related to trade can be explained by looking at the trade balance. Following
the domestic monetary policy shock, the trade balance displays a J-curve dynamic:
it worsens within a year, then starts to improve and becomes positive after 7 quar-
ters. The trade improvement is quite persistent, peaking 10 quarters after the shock
before returning to its long-run value. On impact, the increase in income raises the
demand for imports, and explains the short-run worsening of the trade balance, which
represents an income-absorption e⁄ect. Improvement in the trade-balance arises as
domestic prices overshoot their long-run values and turn the economy into a recession.
The relatively better foreign economic conditions keep the trade-balance in surplus.
From the perspective of Country 2, real economic activity and trade dynamics
are best understood by undertaking decompositions of output and consumption into
their domestic and foreign components. The expansion of output falls in two phases:
initially, rising exports demand launches output, later relatively low domestic pro-
ducer prices translate into rising domestic consumption which further fuels output.
On the consumption side: initially, the appreciation of Country 2￿ s currency generates
an expenditure-switching e⁄ect in favor of foreign goods. This increases the level of
competition among ￿rms in Country 2, and leads to declining producer prices which
further propels the consumption boom.
In short, the domestic monetary expansion generates trade ￿ ows and induces
movements in relative prices and real aggregates. On impact, both countries experi-
ence rising export and import demands. On the one side, Country 1￿ s export demand
increases because foreign agents substitute cheaper imported goods in their consump-
tion basket while imports demand rises to ful￿ll domestic demand. On the other side,
Country 2￿ s export demand increases to ful￿ll foreign demand while import demand
rises because domestic agents substitute cheaper imports in their consumption bas-
ket. Subsequently, both countries experience falling export and import demand as
relative prices overshoot their long-run values. However, while Country 2 lags the
business cycle, it also keeps Country 1 a￿ oat.
5 Open Economy Economic Fluctuations
This section ￿rst describes the dynamic behavior of international business cycles
by focusing on correlations in real and nominal macroeconomic variables between
17economies of the G5. Then, to clear ideas on the international priors used to devel-
oped our open economy macroeconomics model, we estimate a Vector Autoregression
(VAR) that generates impulse responses consistent with the received wisdom. This
agnostic exercise permits us to illustrate the model￿ s plausibility and to capture its
crucial elements.
5.1 Open Economy Business Cycle Statistics
Table 1.3 displays the correlations that occur at business-cycle frequencies for the US
and a aggregate of Japan, Germany, France, and the UK called G4 Economy. The
US data are from the BEA, and the Japanese, German, French, and British data
are from OECD Economic Outlook. The quarterly data cover the period 1974Q1 to
2005Q4 and when necessary are expressed in per capita 2000 US dollars at purchasing-
power-parity.11 For comparison with our business cycle model, we also compute the
moments conditional on a monetary shock using bootstraps methods on the VAR
estimated below.
Output, consumption, exports, and imports tend to be strongly procyclical. The
trade balance is countercyclical with respect to output and consumption. CPI in￿ a-
tion and the expenditure components are procyclical using the unconditional data but
countercyclical using the data conditional on a monetary shock. As for international
prices, the nominal exchange rate is acyclical relative to output and consumption.
Relative to the trade balance, the nominal exchange rate is procyclical with respect
to the unconditional data but countercyclical with respect to the data conditional on
a monetary shock. The terms of trade are countercyclical relative to output and con-
sumption with respect to the unconditional data but procyclical with respect to the
data conditional on a monetary shock. In terms of cross-country correlation, we ob-
served a higher cross-country output correlation relative to consumption correlation.
Finally, CPI in￿ ation across countries are highly correlated.
5.2 Econometric Methodology
We follow the general recursive framework of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and
Christiano et al. (2005) and consider the dynamic response of key macroeconomic
variables for the US and G4 economies to a US monetary policy shock.
FFRt = f (￿t) + "t (19)
Characterization of US monetary policy is given by equation (19) where FFRt
represents the monetary instrument, f is a linear function of the information included
11The data sources and aggregation are described in Appendix A.
18in ￿t, and "t represents the monetary policy shock. The identifying assumption relies




The recursive causal ordering assumes that the vector Y1t contains variables whose
values at time t do not respond contemporaneously to a monetary policy shock while
its counterpart Y2t consists of all other variables included in ￿t. The variables in
Y1t are per capita US real gross domestic product, per capita US real personal ex-
penditure, per capita G4 real gross domestic product, per capita G4 real personal
expenditure, US personal expenditure de￿ ator, G4 personal expenditure de￿ ator,
and per capita US real trade balance with the G4 economy. The variables in Y2t are
the growth rate of per capita US real M1, the nominal exchange rate, and the terms
of trade. The decision to include aggregates of output, consumption, in￿ ation, and
trade balance in Y1t re￿ ects a long standing view that those macroeconomic variables
do not respond contemporaneously to monetary policy shocks. Finally, we measure
the monetary instrument FFRt using the Federal Funds Rate which is the preferred
policy instrument of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and
Christiano et al. (1999, 2005) among others.
The VAR contains two lags of each variable. To compare the given empirical
estimates with our business cycle model, variables in Yt have been logged and ￿ltered
using a one-sided Band-Pass ￿lter with business cycle periodicity except for the de-
￿ ators and the monetary instrument. When the constant term is ignored, the VAR
takes the following representation:
Yt = A1Yt￿1 + A2Yt￿2 + Cet (21)
where C is a 11 ￿ 11 lower triangular matrix, and et is an eleventh-dimensional
vector of zero-mean serially uncorrelated shocks. We estimate the parameters Ai,
i = 1;2, C, and the variance of the elements of et with standard least-square meth-
ods. Using these estimates, we compute the dynamic path of Yt. To maintain con-
sistency with the model presented, we consider an innovation in the Federal Funds
Rate that corresponds to a 1 percent increase in the growth rate of the monetary
aggregate. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), and Christiano, Eichembaum, and
Evans (2005) support this type of money growth process as a good approximation to
an interest rate rule.
The impulse response functions are displayed in Figures 1.7 and 1.8. The straight
lines correspond to the estimated average while the dotted lines represent their 95
percent con￿dence intervals about the point estimates evaluated using Bootstraps
method. The VAR results generally agree with the received wisdom and consequently
pave the way to the estimation of the model.
195.3 Minimum Distance Estimation of the Structural Para-
meters
We calibrate a primary set of parameters and estimate the remainders. The calibrated
parameters are presented in Table 1.4. As in the previous exercise, the discount factors
￿ are 0.99 and households work 20 percent of their time endowment. The US Economy
is characterized by a degree of home bias of 3.74 percent and represents 1/2 of the
world￿ s GDP. The former corresponds to the average share of US exports to GDP
traded with the G4 Economy over the sample period, while the latter corresponds
to the ratio of the US Economy to G4 Economy GDP. Finally, we set steady-state
country-speci￿c money growth rates to the average in￿ ation rates observed in the
sample period, which correspond to 4 percent for the US Economy and 3.8 percent
for the G4 Economy.
Our estimation strategy involves selecting the remaining structural parameters
that minimize the distance between the estimated empirical impulse responses and
the model-based impulse responses. For the purpose of our monetary model, the
relevance of this estimation strategy holds in estimating parameters of the model by
matching conditional dynamics induced by a monetary shock. Formally, we consider
a set of structural parameters   = (￿1;￿2;￿1;￿2;￿1;￿2;’1;’2;￿1;￿2;￿1), a vector
containing the empirical estimates b ￿, and a mapping from   to the model based
impulse response functions ￿( ). To avoid non existence or multiplicity of equilibria,
our structural parameters   are evaluated at a subset of solutions in the neighborhood









b ￿ ￿ ￿( )
i
(22)
where W is a diagonal matrix with the inverse of each impulse response￿ s variances
along the diagonal. Such weighting matrix accounts for the fact that some points
of the impulse response functions are less precisely estimated than others and hence
guarantees that ￿( ) lies as much as possible inside the con￿dence intervals.12 We
consider the ￿rst 16 elements of the impulse response functions and discard the ￿rst
empirical point estimates from the estimation procedure to minimize the impact of
the VAR identi￿cation strategy in the estimation of the model.
The estimated parameters and related standard errors are shown in Table 1.5. Fol-
lowing Ireland (2004), we express the standard errors of our estimates as the square
root of the diagonal elements of the matrix V ￿
￿
[@g ( )=@ ]
0 W [@g ( )=@ ]
￿￿1 =T,
where g ( ) =
￿
b ￿ ￿ ￿( )
￿
and T is the number of impulse responses used in the esti-
12See Boivin and Gianoni (2006) and Christiano et al. (2005).
20mation.13 The parameters governing preferences produce a low elasticity of marginal
cost with respect to real output of approximately 0.25. The elasticity of substitution
between domestic and imported consumption goods are close to the unitary elasticity
of substitution defended by Bergin (2005) and the numbers brought by Backus et al.
(1992). The demand functions￿parameters are estimated such that the elasticities of
demand ￿ hold at d(z)=d = 1. Together, with the estimated values of ’, this implies
that a 1 percent increase in prices decreases demand by roughly 9 percent in the US
and 12 percent in the G4 Economy. In line with Chari et al. (2002) and Christiano
et al. (2005), we estimated the coe¢ cient governing the US autocorrelation of money
growth to be 0.61.
Table 1.6 displays the steady-state fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms as well as the
population densities associated with the estimated model for both countries. The
estimated parameters imply an average age of prices of less then 2.75 quarters and
an expected price duration of 4.06 quarters for the US, and an average age of prices
of less then 2.78 quarters and an expected price duration of 4.06 quarters for the G4
Economy.
5.4 Hits and Misses
Figures 1.9 and 1.10 display the estimated state-dependent model impulse response
functions alongside the VAR impulse response functions. In line with both the re-
ceived wisdom and with the empirical estimates, our estimated model replicates some
key macroeconomic comovements. Following a US monetary expansion: (i) domestic
and foreign output and consumption expand and display hump-shaped responses, (ii)
foreign output expands ￿rst followed by foreign consumption, (ii) monetary policy has
a delayed and gradual e⁄ect on domestic and foreign in￿ ations, (iv) on impact, do-
mestic monetary policy has a de￿ ationary e⁄ect on foreign in￿ ation, (v) the domestic
trade balance displays a J-curve dynamic, (vi) the nominal exchange rate overshoots
its long-run value, and (vii) the domestic terms of trade improve.
On the domestic front, the model does fairly well in replicating the shapes and am-
plitudes of output, consumption, and the trade balance responses to a US monetary
policy shock. Although the model based impulse response functions are qualitatively
consistent with the data, the in￿ ation process implied by the model is not as per-
sistent as the one implied by the data. Moreover, the model is able to replicate the
13Given the complexity of the current structure and the di¢ culties existing in extracting infor-
mation useful to evaluate our model, we should be reassured yet cautious of drawing any strong
conclusions about parameter values. Although we believe that estimating the parameters of our
model by matching the conditional dynamics resulting from a monetary policy shock is appropriate,
important identi￿cation and speci￿cation issues arise in the estimation of dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium models. Canova and Sala (2005) o⁄er an informative discussion on the problematic
associated with our estimation strategy.
21shapes and timing of foreign output, consumption and in￿ ation, but has some dif-
￿culties matching their amplitudes. As for international trade ￿ ows and prices, the
model is successful at explaining the procyclicality of exports and imports, and the
countercyclicality of the trade balance. The model also replicates reasonably well the
behavior of the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade up to a 8-12 quarters
after the shock. Finally, the estimated model does fairly well in replicating within
and cross-country correlations between prices and real quantities.14 Altogether, the
relatively basic model studied here does far better than current NOEM models in
accounting for open economy business cycle responses to monetary policy shocks.
6 Conclusion
This paper builds a modern NOEM model consistent with many empirical aspects
of international economic ￿ uctuations while stressing pricing behavior and exchange
rate e⁄ects highlighted in the traditional Keynesian approach. In contrast with pre-
vious NOEM works, the introduction of state-dependent pricing and strategic com-
plementarity implies a gradual transmission of monetary policy actions to aggregate
economic activity and emphasizes the expenditure-switching role of exchange rate
adjustments. The resulting movements in relative prices and real macroeconomic ag-
gregates mimic the comovements observed in the data that were the focus of standard
Keynesian models. By replicating key ￿ uctuations in real and nominal economic ac-
tivity, our model therefore o⁄ers a new framework in which to address di⁄erent issues
related to international economic activity.
14In this model, real quantities correlations are high because consumption is the sole expenditure
component. Baxter and Landry (2006) introduce capital accumulation to a similar model and
observed moments in real quantities that are close to the empirical estimates.
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7.1 Appendix A: Data
Source: BEA
￿ Quarterly real gross domestic product
￿ Quarterly real personal consumption expenditure
￿ Quarterly personal consumption expenditure price de￿ ator
￿ Quarterly exports price index
￿ Quarterly imports price index
￿ Quarterly working-age population
￿ Monthly e⁄ective Federal Funds rate
￿ Monthly M1 money stock
￿ Monthly Trade Weighted exchange rate index - Major Currencies
￿ Monthly exports/imports to/from Japan
￿ Monthly exports/imports to/from Germany
￿ Monthly exports/imports to/from United Kingdom
￿ Monthly exports/imports to/from France
Source: OECD Economic Outlook
￿ Quarterly nominal gross domestic product for Japan, Germany, France, and the UK.
￿ Quarterly nominal private ￿nal consumption expenditure for Japan, Germany, France,
and the UK.
￿ Quarterly gross domestic product de￿ ator for Japan, Germany, France, and the UK.
￿ Quarterly private ￿nal consumption expenditure de￿ ator for Japan, Germany, France,
and the UK.
￿ Quarterly Working-age population for Japan, Germany, France, and the UK.
￿ Annual Purchasing Power Parity in US dollars for Japan, Germany, France, and the
UK.
G4 aggregates are built using working-age population weights and translated in
2000 US dollars using the year 2000 PPP values.
237.2 Appendix B: Demand Aggregators








￿(d(z)=d)dz = 1 (B.1)
The country-speci￿c aggregate demands d for goods are implicitly de￿ned by a
demand aggregator ￿ such that an aggregate producer price index P P holds for each
country. The ￿rst order condition of the expenditure minimization problem yields:







where Z is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. Consequently, the ￿rst order












Given the demand curves and the multipliers, the aggregate producer price indices









dz = 1 (B.4)
7.3 Appendix C: Adjustment Costs Structure
We adopt the costs structure used in Dotsey and King (2005) and described in John-
ston, King, and Landry (2006). The adjustment costs are stochastic and idiosyncratic
across ￿rms, and are governed by country-speci￿c cumulative distribution functions
(CDF) G(x) on the interval 0 ￿ x ￿ B and corresponding density functions g (x).
Under the adjustment rules, a country-speci￿c ￿rm￿ s probability of adjustment is:











Hence, the fraction of price-adjusting ￿rms in each vintage is determined by a
marginal ￿rm being indi⁄erent to price adjustment.
The functional form used to derived the adjustment costs functions is the arctan-
gent. This functional form is a monotonically increasing function that maps the real
24line into the interval (￿￿;￿) in di⁄erent shapes. In this paper, we use the an interval
of the arctangent [x;x] and assume that
x(￿) = ￿ ￿ (x ￿ x) + x (C.3)
where ￿ is restricted to the range 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Finally, we assume that the inverse
of the CDF takes the form
￿ (￿) = K1s(x) + K2 (C.4)
The inverse CDF takes on a zero value at ￿ = 0 and a value of B at ￿ = 1:
0 = K1s(x) + K2 (C.5)
B = K1s(x) + K2







The results reported in the paper use value of B = 0:015 and x 2 [0;4]. Since
the steady-state fractions of households￿times devoted to production are n = 0:2,
setting B = 0:015 involves that the maximum adjustment costs are 7.5 percent of
production times in the hypothetical economy. This also implies that the resources
devoted to price adjustments correspond roughly to 0.8 percent of ￿rm￿ s revenues
with a maximum adjustment cost of 8.2 percent of revenues.
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29Parameter values governing: Country 1 Country 2
Preferences
￿ Discount rate 0.99 0.99
￿ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.25 0.25
￿ Elasticity of labor supply 0.05 0.05
n Fraction of time working 0.20 0.20
Demands
% Demand curvature 1.02 1.02
￿ Elasticity of demand at 1 10 10
Countries
s Country￿ s relative size 0.50 0.50
￿ Degree of home bias 0.20 0.20
￿ Elasticity of substitution - Country 1 1
Productivity
a Total factor productivity 1 1
Monetary policies
￿ Steady-state money growth rate 0.01 0.01
￿ Money growth autocorrelation 0.50 0.50
Table 1.1: Benchmark parameters
30Quarter(s) since last adjustment
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
￿j Probability of adjustment ￿ 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.39 0.67 1
!j Population density 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.03 ￿
Table 1.2: Stationary distributions of ￿rms across countries
3132Parameter values governing: US Economy G4 Economy
Preferences
￿ Discount rate 0.99 0.99
n Fraction of time working 0.20 0.20
Countries
s Country￿ s relative size 0.5 0.5
￿ Degree of home bias 0.0375 0.0375
Productivity
a Total factor productivity 1 1
Monetary policies
￿ Steady-state money growth rate 0.01 0.0095
Table 1.4: Calibrated parameters
33Parameter values governing: US Economy G4 Economy
Preferences
￿ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.202(0:002) 0.220(0:071)
￿ Elasticity of labor supply 0.042(0:016) 0.041(0:145)
￿ Elasticity of substitution - Country 0.836(0:342) 0.9276(0:343)
Demands
% Demand curvature 1.020(0:001) 1.020(0:035)
￿ Elasticity of demand at 1 7.006(0:004) 9.171(0:180)
US Monetary policies
￿ Money growth autocorrelation 0.6058(0:006) 0
Table 1.5: Estimated parameters
34Quarter(s) since last adjustment
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
US Economy
￿j Probability of adjustment ￿ 0.034 0.111 0.219 0.378 0.641 1
!j Population density 0.246 0.238 0.211 0.165 0.103 0.037 ￿
G4 Economy
￿j Probability of adjustment ￿ 0.039 0.116 0.226 0.396 0.500 1
!j Population density 0.246 0.236 0.209 0.162 0.098 0.049 ￿
Table 1.6: Estimated stationary distributions of ￿rms across countries




















































US bilateral real exports
US nominal exchange rates
Figure 1.1: Annual changes in US nominal exchange rates versus annual changes in
bilateral US real exports.




















Figure 1.2: Dixit-Stiglitz and Kimball demand and pro￿t functions



















































































































































































Figure 1.4: Output, consumption, and CPI in￿ ation
39Figure 1.5: Nominal exchage rate decomposition




















































































































Figure 1.6: Nominal and real side of trade






























































































































Figure 1.7: US and G4 domestic responses to a US monetary policy shock




















































































Figure 1.8: US international aggregates responses to a US monetary policy shock
































































































































Figure 1.9: International VAR versus state-dependent pricing model






















































































Figure 1.10: International VAR versus state-dependent pricing model
45